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THE FUGITIVE DISMISSAL RULE
APPLIED TO PRE-APPEAL
FUGITIVITY
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,' the United States Supreme
Court held that appellate courts may dismiss the appeal of a crimi-
nal defendant who becomes a fugitive if the fugitive status has suffi-
cient connection to the appellate process. 2 However, the Court also
held that when the fugitive status occurs prior to the filing of the
appeal, such status generally lacks the requisite connection to dis-
miss the appeal. 3 The Court did, however, state that in certain ex-
ceptional situations the appellate courts could apply general rules of
dismissal to pre-appeal flights.4
This Note argues that, while the Court correctly concluded that
pre-appeal flight generally lacks sufficient connection to the appel-
late process to warrant dismissal, the Court incorrectly reasoned
that the justifications supporting dismissal in post-appeal flight
cases do not apply to pre-appeal flights. In addition, this Note ar-
gues that the Court properly permitted appellate courts to exercise
discretion through applying general rules of dismissal to specific,
recurring situations in which pre-appeal flight is sufficiently con-
nected to the appellate process. Finally, this Note predicts the fu-
ture applicability of the fugitive dismissal rule to pre-appeal flights
after Ortega-Rodriguez.
II. BACKGROUND
The fugitive dismissal rule provides federal appellate courts
with the authority to dismiss the appeal of a criminal defendant if
the defendant becomes a fugitive while the appeal is pending.5 A
criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to an ap-
1 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993).
2 Id. at 1208.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1208-09.
5 See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
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peal. 6 Instead, the right to an appeal is provided for by federal stat-
ute.7 For this reason, appellate courts have the authority to
promulgate the procedural rules for perfecting an appeal., The fu-
gitive dismissal rule has been developed based on this authority.
The United States Supreme Court and various circuit courts have
advanced several justifications for this rule.
The Supreme Court first adopted the fugitive dismissal rule in
Smith v. United States.9 In Smith, the Court dismissed the defendant's
writ of error because the defendant had escaped and was not under
the control of the court.10 The Court in Smith based its decision on
the concern that any judgment it issued would be unenforceable."
It stated, "[i]t is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a
criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ,
is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may
render."' 2 The Supreme Court has continued to advance the en-
forceability justification in support of dismissing fugitive appeals. 13
The Court has gone even further and stated that fugitive appeals
may be dismissed even if the defendant is recaptured before any ap-
pellate action is taken.' 4
The Supreme Court provided another justification for the fugi-
tive dismissal rule in Molinaro v. NewJersey.' 5 The defendant in Moli-
naro, convicted of abortion and conspiracy to commit abortion,
failed to surrender himself after he had appealed. 16 In dismissing
the appeal, the Molinaro Court reasoned that the defendant, by es-
caping after he appealed, became disentitled to an appeal. 17 The
6 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1989).
8 See FED. R. APP. P. 47.
9 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
10 Id. The Supreme Court ordered that the cause be taken off the court's docket
unless the defendant voluntarily surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court be-
low on or before the first day of the Supreme Court's next term. Id. at 97-98.
11 Id. at 97. The Court articulated its enforceability concerns as follows:
If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If we
reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may consider most for
his interest. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to hear and decide what
may prove to be only a moot case.
Id.
12 Id.
13 See Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S 189 (1949); Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692
(1887).
14 See Estelle V. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975). See infra note 22 and accompanying
text.
15 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 366. The Court stated:
No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits
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Court has voiced other justifications for a dismissal rule as well. In
Estelle v. Dorrough,18 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Texas statute that provided for the automatic dismissal of an appeal
by a felony defendant if he escaped while the appeal is pending.19
In so doing, the Supreme Court reasoned that the statute discour-
aged escape and encouraged voluntary surrender, and also that it
promoted "the efficient, dignified operation of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals." 2
0
In short, the Supreme Court has consistently approved the dis-
missal of a criminal defendant's appeal if the defendant becomes a
fugitive while the appeal is pending.21 In addition, the Court has
ruled that dismissal is appropriate even when a defendant is recap-
tured before the court of appeals has acted.22 Prior to Ortega-Rodri-
guez v. United States, however, the Supreme Court had never been
confronted with the issue of whether a court may dismiss the appeal
of a defendant who escapes and is recaptured before invoking ap-
pellate jurisdiction.
Several appellate courts have addressed this issue, however.
The different approaches of the circuits can be classified into three
categories: those that follow the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal rule,
those that do not follow the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal rule, and
those who have not confronted the issue. 23
of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from
the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape
does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we
believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for deter-
mination of his claims.
Id.
18 420 U.S. 534 (1975).
19 Id. at 535. The Texas statute in question also provided for reinstatement of appeal
if the defendant voluntarily surrenders within ten days of the escape. TEx CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 44.09 (West 1966).
20 Dorrough, 420 U.S. at 537. In that case, a Texas district court convicted the defend-
ant of robbery. The defendant then filed a timely appeal, escaped from jail and was
recaptured two days later. As a result, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals removed
the appeal from its docket, pursuant to the dismissal statute. Id. at 534-37.
21 See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876); Bonahan v. State of Nebraska, 125
U.S. 692 (1887); Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 365.
22 See Dorrough, 420 U.S. at 534.
23 It should be noted, however, that nearly all circuits agree that courts possess the
authority to dismiss appeals if the defendant becomes a fugitive while the appeal is
pending. See United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Sper-
ling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Virgin Islands v.
James, 621 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Glomb, 877 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Coleman, 834 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1987); Brinlee v. United States, 483
F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1973); Hussein v. INS, 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Swigart, 490 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Knight, No. 91-334, 1992 WL
281662 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1853 (1993). The Fourth Circuit,
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The Eleventh Circuit has extended the fugitive dismissal rule to
apply to defendants who flee before filing notice of appeal. 24 In
United States v. Holmes,25 the Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant
who flees after conviction, but before sentencing, waives his right to
appeal from the conviction unless the defendant can show that his
escape was due to matters completely beyond his control. 26
The Holmes court based its decision on several factors. First, the
court noted that flight after conviction would postpone filing a no-
tice of appeal, and the resulting delay would "make a meaningful
appeal impossible in many cases." 27 Second, the court reasoned
that if there were a reversal, the delay caused by pre-appeal flight
would prejudice the government in locating witnesses and retrying
the case.28 Third, the court held that defendants who flee before
appeal are equally disentitled to call upon the resources of the court
of appeals as are defendants who flee after filing an appeal.29
Subsequent to Holmes, the Eleventh Circuit has expanded its
dismissal rule to include defendants who flee during trial. In United
States v. London,30 the Eleventh Circuit followed its decision in Holmes
and dismissed the appeal of a defendant who fled while his case was
on trial and remained a fugitive for three years.31 The London court
noted that "the defendant disrupted a prolonged trial and flaunted
his disregard for the orderly court procedures for the determination
of whether he was guilty or not guilty."'3 2 The court concluded that
the justifications for dismissing the appeal of a defendant who flees
before conviction are more compelling than those for a defendant
in United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984), decided to hear the appeal
of a defendant who fled after his appeal but was recaptured less than thirty days later,
but the court did state that it had the discretion to dismiss the appeal. Finally, the Sev-
enth Circuit has not ruled on the issue of fugitive appeals.
24 See United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982).
25 680 F.2d at 1372.
26 Id at 1373. The Eleventh Circuit did state, however, that a defendant who flees
after conviction and before sentencing does not waive the right to appeal any post-con-
viction errors. Id.
27 Id. at 1374.
28 Id.
29 Id. The court stated, "[w]ere we to hold otherwise, criminal defendants who flee
prior to sentencing would be permitted upon apprehension to seek relief from the very
legal system that they previously had seen fit only to defy." Id. This rationale directly
parallels the Supreme Court's reasoning in Molinaro v. NewJersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
30 723 F.2d 1538 (1lth Cir. 1984).
31 Id. at 1539. The trial court used its discretion to allow the trial to proceed in
absentia. Id. at 1538-39.
32 Id. at 1539.
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who flees after conviction, such as the defendant in Holmes.33 Ac-
cordingly, the Eleventh Circuit's fugitive dismissal rule applies to
defendants who abscond at any time either before or after filing no-
tice of appeal.
Not all circuit courts are, however, in agreement with the Elev-
enth Circuit. Of the five circuit courts that have ruled on this issue,
three circuits have followed the Eleventh Circuit's rule and two cir-
cuits have declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit.
The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have extended the fugi-
tive dismissal rule to include cases in which defendants flee before
filing notice of appeal.3 4 The decisions by these circuits and the de-
cision by the Eleventh Circuit differ in only one respect. The Sec-
ond, Third and Fifth Circuits have all indicated that, in dismissing
the appeals of defendants who fled prior to appealing, they were
exercising judicial discretion.3 5 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
stated in Holmes that the defendant, by fleeing before appeal,
"waive[d] his right to appeal."'3 6 Thus, it would appear that the
Eleventh Circuit's dismissal rule is automatically applied in pre-ap-
peal flight situations, while the other circuits exercise discretion in
pre-appeal flight cases.
The First and Ninth Circuits have declined to follow the Elev-
enth Circuit's pre-appeal dismissal rule.3 7 In United States v.
Anagnos,38 the First Circuit denied the government's motion to dis-
miss the appeal of a defendant who fled after conviction but before
sentencing.3 9 The Anagnos court refused to extend its dismissal rule
beyond one which dismisses the appeal of a defendant who flees
after filing notice of appeal but is recaptured and in custody at the
time the appellate court takes any action.40 As the Anagnos court
stated, "[defendant's] misconduct was in the district court, and
33 Id. As in Holmes, the London court dismissed only the appeal of the convictions, not
the appeal of any sentencing errors. Id.
34 United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Matista, 932
F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wright, 902 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Devalle, 894 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990).
35 Persico, 853 F.2d at 137; Matista, 932 F.2d at 1056; Wright, 902 F.2d at 242; Devalle,
894 F.2d at 136.
36 United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
37 United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988); Katz v. United States, 920
F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1990).
38 853 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).
39 Id. at 1. The defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute. The defendant was recaptured and
sentenced for the narcotics convictions, and was also sentenced to an additional period
for bail-jumping. Id. at 1-2.
40 Id. at 2. The court referred to its decision in United States v. Puzzanghera, 820
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 900 (1987), which dismissed the appeal of a
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should affect consequences in that court, not in ours." 4 1
While the First Circuit expressly declined to follow the Eleventh
Circuit,42 the Ninth Circuit, in Katz v. United States,43 only implicitly
rejected the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal rule. In Katz, the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied the government's motion to dismiss the appeal of a de-
fendant who fled after filing an appeal but was recaptured and in
custody at the time the government's motion was heard. 44 The Katz
court reasoned that the disentitlement doctrine did not apply "when
the person seeking judicial relief is no longer a fugitive."'45 If the
Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss the appeal of a defendant who flees
after filing an appeal, it follows that the Ninth Circuit would most
likely have rejected the Eleventh Circuit's rule of dismissal of pre-
appeal flight cases.
At the time the Supreme Court decided Ortega-Rodriguez, the re-
maining courts of appeals-the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits-had not been confronted with the issue
of fugitive dismissal for pre-appeal flights, and had not indicated in
any way whether they would follow the Eleventh Circuit's fugitive
dismissal rule. The Supreme Court therefore attempted to guide
the appellate courts with respect to this issue in Ortega-Rodriguez.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 7, 1988, a customs service pilot observed a low
flying airplane dropping bales to a boat circling in the waters near
Cay Sal Bank, located approximately midway between the Florida
Keys and Cuba.46 The customs plane was flying too high to identify
the boat, but the pilot described the boat as a forty to fifty-foot white
vessel.47 The next morning, a different customs pilot spotted a boat
resembling the one seen the day before, thirty miles from where the
defendant who fled after filing an appeal but was recaptured before any appellate court
action.
41 Anagnos, 853 F.2d at 2.
42 Id.
43 920 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1990).
44 Id at 611. The defendant was convicted and sentenced, and then filed a timely
appeal in 1971. That appeal was dismissed because it was not perfected. Released on
bond, the defendant fled the jurisdiction of the court. Thirteen years later, in 1984, the
defendant was arrested in Norway and extradited to the United States. In 1989, the
defendant filed a motion to correct, vacate or set aside the 1971 sentence. It is this 1989
motion that the government had moved to dismiss pursuant to a fugitive dismissal rule.
Id.
45 Id. at 613.




bales were dropped, headed toward Cuba.48 The pilot observed nu-
merous bales stacked on the nearby beach. 49 At this point the pilot
contacted a coast guard cutter, whose crew intercepted, boarded,
and searched the boat but found no narcotics or other incriminating
evidence. 50
Jose Antonio Ortega-Rodriguez was one of three individuals on
the boat. 5 1 These three individuals were arrested, tried, and con-
victed of both possession with the intent to distribute and conspir-
ing to possess with the intent to distribute over five kilograms of
cocaine. 52
On June 15, 1989, the date set for sentencing, Ortega-Rodri-
guez did not appear before the district court and was sentenced in
absentia to a prison term of nineteen years and seven months, to be
followed by a five year period of supervised release. 53 While
Ortega-Rodriguez's two co-defendants filed timely appeals of their
convictions and sentences, no appeal was filed on behalf of Ortega-
Rodriguez. 5
4
Eleven months later, on May 24, 1990, Ortega-Rodriguez was
apprehended. 55 He was indicted and found guilty of contempt of
court and failure to appear.56 The district court imposed a prison
sentence of twenty-one months followed by a three year period of
supervised release, to be served after completion of the sentences
on the narcotics offenses.57 Counsel for Ortega-Rodriguez then
filed a motion to vacate the sentence and for resentencing, which
the district court granted. 58 Subsequently, the district court resen-
tenced Ortega-Rodriguez to a prison term of fifteen years and eight
months, followed by a five year period of supervised release, to
which Ortega-Rodriguez filed a timely appeal. 59
48 Id. This boat was a thirty to forty foot long white sport fishing vessel. Id.
49 Id. at 1201-02.
50 Id. at 1202.
51 Id.
52 Id.




56 Id. After Ortega-Rodriguez's arrest, the court of appeals disposed of the co-
defendants' appeals, affirming one conviction, but reversing the other due to insuffi-
ciency of evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1203. The district court denied Ortega-Rodriguez's motion for judgment of
acquittal. Id.
59 Id. Because Ortega-Rodriguez would have been barred by time limits from ap-
pealing his initial sentence, the only reason he was able to file an appeal was because the
district court granted his motion to resentence. Id. at n.9.
1092 [Vol. 84
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal without
an explanation. 60 The government argued that the fugitive dismis-
sal rule, as developed by the Eleventh Circuit in Holmes, precluded
the appeal of a defendant who escaped prior to appealing.61 There-
fore, it can only be inferred that the court of appeals based the dis-
missal on the Holmes rule, which provides dismissal for defendants
who flee prior to filing an appeal. 62
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether a defendant who flees and is recaptured while his case is in
the district court waives his right to appeal.63
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, 64 held that in order to apply
the fugitive dismissal rule there must be a connection between the
defendant's flight and the appellate process, and that the requisite
connection is generally lacking when a defendant's flight occurs
before the appeal stage.65 Accordingly, the Court vacated the Elev-
enth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case.66
The Court began by stating the longstanding rule, adopted by
the Court in Smith, that an appellate court may dismiss a criminal
defendant's appeal if the defendant is a fugitive from justice while
the appeal is pending. 67 The Court then discussed the various rea-
sons supporting the fugitive dismissal rule.
Justice Stevens observed that the fugitive dismissal rule origi-
nally developed because the Court was concerned that any judg-
ment it issued would prove to be unenforceable against fugitive
defendants. 68 Another reason the Court gave for upholding dismis-
sal of a fugitive's appeal, given in Molinaro, was the notion that flee-
ing during the pendency of appeal disentitled the defendant to an
appeal.69 Justice Stevens considered the disentitlement theory to be
60 United States v. Ortega-Rodriguez, No. 91-5083, 1993 WL 60980 (11 th Cir. Jan.
22, 1993).
61 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1201 n.l.
62 Id.
63 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2964 (1992).
64 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter.
65 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209.
66 Id. at 1210.
67 Id. at 1203 (citing Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876)).
68 Id. at 1203.
69 Id. at 1204. The Court quoted Molinaro at length:
No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits
1994] 1093
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the same as a theory of abandonment of the right to appeal.70 Fi-
nally, Justice Stevens concluded this portion of the opinion by reit-
erating that the Court has consistently approved dismissal of appeal
when the defendant is a fugitive during the appellate process, and
that in addition to the enforceability justification, the fugitive dis-
missal rule "serves an important deterrent function and advances an
interest in efficient dignified appellate practice." 71
Next, the Court asserted that the Eleventh Circuit's rule in
Holmes, which provided dismissal of an appeal by a former fugitive
who was returned to custody prior to sentencing, was based on the
disentitlement rationale formulated by the Molinaro Court and the
concern that the government might be prejudiced by delays in the
proceedings caused by the escape. 72 The Court then distinguished
the rule in Holmes from the rule in Molinaro on the grounds that the
Holmes rule applies to defendants who escape while their cases are
before the district courts, allows dismissal of appeals of convictions
but not appeals of sentences, 73 and requires automatic dismissal in-
stead of allowing for judicial discretion. 74
The Court noted that the justifications supporting dismissal in
cases where a defendant flees while his appeal is pending demand
-some connection between a defendant's fugitive status and the ap-
pellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reason-
able response. ' 75 Accordingly, the Court concluded that those
justifications are necessarily attenuated in a case where flight and
recapture occur while the case is pending before the district court.76
To support its conclusion, the Court explained that a defendant
who is recaptured before the appellate process begins presents no
risk of unenforceability because the defendant is under the control
of the court of appeals throughout the entire course of the appeal.77
of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from
the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape
does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we
believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for deter-
mination of his claims.
Id. (quoting Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1204-05.
72 Id. at 1205.
73 In analyzing the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Holmes, the Court stated that "be-
cause flight cannot fairly be construed as a waiver of appeal from errors occurring after
recapture, defendants who flee pre-sentencing retain their right to appeal sentencing
errors, though they lose the right to appeal their convictions." Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1205-06.




Furthermore, the Court noted that when a defendant's escape and
recapture occur before the appeal stage, the resulting delay affects
only the district court hearing the case.
78
Similarly, dismissal of these appeals does not operate to protect
the dignity of the appellate court because "the contemptuous disre-
spect manifested by his flight was directed at the district court." 79
For these reasons, the Court determined that district courts are in a
better position, in most cases, to sanction pre-appeal fugitivity.80
The Court also reasoned that the deterrence rationale does not sup-
port a rule allowing appellate courts to dismiss former fugitives' ap-
peals.8 ' The Court relied on the fact that the district court should
sanction behavior that occurs under its jurisdiction: flight during a
pending case, the Court noted, is treated as the separate offense of
contempt of court.8
2
The Court held that the interests served by the fugitive dismis-
sal rule do not support a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by
former fugitives who have been recaptured before the appellate pro-
cess begins.83 The Court did proceed to limit this holding,
however.
The Court admitted that, in some instances, the actions of de-
fendants before appeal might impact the appellate process enough
to warrant an appellate sanction.8 4 As the Court noted, "we do not
hold that a court is entirely without authority to dismiss an appeal
because of fugitive status predating the appeal."8' 5 A long escape,
even if ended before the appeal, could prejudice the government in
locating witnesses and presenting evidence. 6 Accordingly, the
Court bestowed upon appellate courts the authority to sanction with
dismissal those cases in which the appellate process is adversely af-
fected.8 7 The Court warned that appellate courts should not use
their discretion to consider dismissals on a case by case basis, but
rather should develop "generally applicable rules to cover specific,
78 Id. The Court claimed that Ortega-Rodriguez's 11-month period of fugitivity
caused a 19-month delay in the district court proceedings, but that the appellate court
was unaffected by the defendant's escape. Id. at n.16.




83 Id. at 1208.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. The Court also noted that in cases like Ortega-Rodriguez's, where the appeal
is premised on insufficiency of evidence, the Government would not be prejudiced by a
long delay because those appeals do not permit retrial. Id.




In the present case, Ortega-Rodriguez's flight prevented the
court of appeals from consolidating his appeal with the appeals of
his codefendants.89 The Court concluded that the dismissal rule can
only be applied when pre-appeal flight interferes with the operation
of the appellate process. 90 Accordingly, the Court vacated the judg-
ment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case to decide
whether a flight that causes severance of appeals affects the appel-
late process enough to warrant the sanction of dismissal. 9'
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,92 agreed with
the Court that dismissal requires a connection between the escape
and the appellate process, but disagreed with the Court's conclusion
that recapture before appeal generally breaks the connection. 93 For
this reason, the dissent would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's
judgment.
94
The dissent argued that the only distinction between a defend-
ant who flees pre-appeal and one who flees post-appeal is that the
latter has filed a notice of appeal. 95 Accordingly, the dissent noted,
"there is no reason why the authority to dismiss an appeal should be
based on the timing of a defendant's escape." 96
According to the dissent, appellate courts have the authority to
create and enforce procedural rules governing litigation.97 The dis-
sent argued that the only limits on the appellate court's authority
are that the rules created may not violate the Constitution or a stat-
ute, and that the rules must be reasonable in light of the interests
they are designed to protect.98 First, the dissent argued, the Elev-
enth Circuit's dismissal rule does not violate the Constitution be-
cause a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to an
88 Id. at 1209 n.23.
89 Id. at 1209.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1210. The Court declined to apply a general rule of dismissal when pre-
appeal flight causes severance of appeals, and instead left it up to the appellate courts to
decide independently. Id. at 1209 n.24.
92 Justices White, O'Connor and Thomas joined in the dissent.
93 Id. at 1210 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1210 n.1 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
95 Id. at 1210 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
96 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
97 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985)).
98 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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appeal.99 Second, the dismissal rule does not violate the statute
granting criminal defendants the right to appeal, 0 0 because that
statute does not provide the procedural requirements for perfecting
an appeal. 1 1 In fact, the dissent noted, the procedural require-
ments for perfecting appeals are contained in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which give each court of appeals the authority
to make rules governing appellate practice. 0 2 Finally, the dissent
argued that the fugitive dismissal rule is reasonable because it is
designed to protect the appellate court's jurisdiction and to ensure
the efficient use of the court's limited resources.
103
The dissent then opposed the majority's assertion that a de-
fendant's flight before appeal generally has no connection to the
appellate process.' 0 4 For example, the dissent observed that the ap-
pellate process is delayed for, at a minimum, the amount of time the
defendant is at large. 10 5 The dissent argued that, because a fugi-
tive's case could turn up unexpectedly on an appellate court's
docket, the delay could result in damage to docket organization and
predictability.10
6
Another possibly damaging result of the delay caused by a de-
fendant's pre-appeal flight is the severance of appeals. 10 7 The dis-
sent noted that in the present case, the Eleventh Circuit heard the
appeals of the two codefendants during the period of Ortega-Rodri-
guez's fugitivity, as opposed to hearing all three appeals concur-
rently. Ortega-Rodriguez's flight, therefore, placed an increased
burden on the appellate court to hear his appeal separately.'08 The
dissent also argued that the Eleventh Circuit's fugitive dismissal rule
serves an interest in deterring flight and encouraging voluntary sur-
render. 10 9 The dissent stated that the majority's holding, in con-
trast, encourages flight and discourages voluntary surrender
99 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656
(1977)).
100 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1948).
101 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing FED. R. App. P. 47). Rule 47 states:
Each court of appeals by action of a majority of the circuit judges in regular active
service may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not
inconsistent with these rules. In all cases not provided for by rule, the courts of
appeals may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
FED. R. App. P. 47.
103 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1211 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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because a defendant who escapes before appeal is in a no-lose posi-
tion since he would still be able to appeal when, and if, he is re-
turned to custody.' 10
The dissent also disagreed with the Court's argument that a de-
fendant's flight shows disrespect for the district court only and that
therefore the district court is the proper authority to sanction the
defendant.11' The dissent contended that a defendant who flees
before appeal flouts the authority of the entire judicial process, not
only the district court.' 12 The appellate court, according to the dis-
sent, ought to be able to respond to such conduct, as it equally in-
sults the appellate court's integrity.' 13
Finally, the dissent acknowledged the fact that the Court's hold-
ing made an exception for cases that significantly interfere with the
operation of the appellate process, 14 but argued that this rule is too
narrow."15 While the Court's exception would apply to cases in
which retrial is negatively affected, cases in which meaningful appeal
is impossible and cases that involve multiple defendants, it fails to
include cases "where sheer delay caused by the fugitivity of the lone
defendant has an adverse affect on the appellate process.""
t6
For these reasons, the dissent concluded that in cases in which
fugitivity obstructs the workings of the appellate process in any way,
the fugitive dismissal rule should be applied."i 7 Accordingly, be-
cause Ortega-Rodriguez's flight delayed the appellate process by at
least nineteen months and forced the severance of his appeal from
that of his codefendants, the dissent would have held that the Elev-
enth Circuit correctly applied the fugitive dismissal rule.' i8
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Supreme Court improperly deter-
mined that the justifications supporting a fugitive dismissal rule in
cases in which the defendant flees after filing an appeal do not gen-
erally apply to cases in which the defendant flees prior to filing an
appeal. However, this Note also asserts that the Supreme Court
correctly concluded that pre-appeal flight generally lacks a sufficient
110 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
''' Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
112 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
113 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208-10).
115 Id. at 1212 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
116 Id. (Rehnquist, GJ., dissenting).
117 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
118 Id. at 1212-13 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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connection to the appellate process to warrant the sanction of dis-
missal. Finally, this Note argues that the Court properly granted
appellate courts the authority to exercise discretion in formulating
general rules of dismissal for specific and recurring situations in
which pre-appeal flight does adversely affect the appellate process.
The arguments on each side are clear. The defendant, Ortega-
Rodriguez, argued that courts of appeals should consider the dis-
missal of former fugitives' appeals on a discretionary, case by case
basis, and in particular that the Eleventh Circuit should have exer-
cised that discretion to hear the appeal on its merits.' 19 In contrast,
the government argued that the rule of the Eleventh Circuit dis-
missing appeals of defendants who escape prior to filing an appeal is
a reasonable exercise of the appellate court's supervisory authority
and should be affirmed) 20 The Supreme Court struck a balance be-
tween these two arguments by holding that pre-appeal flight gener-
ally lacks a sufficient connection to the appellate process to warrant
the sanction of dismissal, but that appellate courts may exercise dis-
cretion to apply general rules of dismissal for specific, recurring sit-
uations in which pre-appeal flight adversely affects the appellate
process. 121
A. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FUGITIVE DISMISSAL RULE APPLY TO
PRE-APPEAL FLIGHTS
Courts have advanced five justifications for applying a dismissal
rule to defendants who escape after filing an appeal. These five jus-
tifications include unenforceability concerns, protecting the dignity
of the courts, deterring flight, promoting the efficient operation of
appellate courts, and avoiding the prejudicial impact of a delay in
the appellate proceedings.1 22 The Supreme Court incorrectly con-
cluded that these justifications do not apply to pre-appeal flights.
The first justification, the unenforceability concern, was the
original justification advanced in support of the fugitive dismissal
rule.' 23 Courts have viewed this concern two different ways. First,
119 Brief for Petitioner at 9, 11, Ortega-Rodriguez (91-7749).
120 Brief for United States at 18-19, Ortega-Rodriguez (91-7749).
121 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. The Court's holding on the one hand sup-
ported defendant's contention that pre-appeal flight does not automatically warrant dis-
missal, but on the other hand left some discretion in the hands of the appellate courts to
determine individually which pre-appeal flights have a sufficient connection to the appel-
late process. In addition, the Court noted that appellate court discretion should not be
on a case by case basis, but rather through general rules applying to specific, recurring
situations. See supra note 88.
122 See United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1988).
123 Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
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from the appellate courts' perspective, if a defendant is at large
when the appeal is being heard, it would be a waste of time for an
appellate court to render a decision that it had no way to enforce. 
1 24
From the standpoint of the fugitive, not being in custody when the
appeal is heard provides the fugitive with the tactical advantage of
waiting to see the outcome before deciding to return to custody.
125
In this respect, the fugitive dismissal rule serves to prevent an appel-
late court from making a decision it cannot enforce and also to pre-
vent defendants from gaining a tactical advantage by fleeing from
custody.
It is true that this enforceability justification will not apply to
pre-appeal flight and recapture, because if the defendant was re-
turned to custody, the appellate court's decision would be enforcea-
ble. However, the fact that this justification does not apply to pre-
appeal flight does not significantly affect this analysis since the en-
forceability justification has been eroded through decisions of the
Supreme Court. For instance, in Dorrough, the Court upheld the dis-
missal of the appeal of a defendant who fled after filing an appeal,
but who was recaptured and in custody at the time of the appeal.
126
Therefore, through its decision in Dorrough, the Supreme Court has
indicated that enforceability of an appellate court's decision is not
determinative of whether the fugitive dismissal rule should be ap-
plied. For this reason, this analysis will place more weight on the
remaining four justifications supporting the fugitive dismissal rule.
The second justification for a fugitive dismissal rule stems from
the disentitlement rationale given by the Court in Molinaro.127 This
justification provides that a defendant who flees from custody while
the appeal is pending shows such disrespect for the court's authority
that the fugitive becomes disentitled to an appeal. 128 Therefore, the
fugitive dismissal rule serves to protect the dignity of the appellate
court. This Note disagrees with the Court's assertion that such dis-
respect disappears if the defendant flees before filing an appeal.
The Court argued that a defendant who escapes prior to filing
an appeal disrespects the district court but not the appellate
court. 12 9 However, a defendant who attempts to escape from cus-
tody almost certainly does so to free himself from any kind of judi-
cial restraint, whether it be because she is innocent and does not
124 Id.
125 See Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1990).
126 Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975).
127 Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970).
128 See United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984).
129 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (1993).
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want to be falsely imprisoned, or because she is guilty and simply
does not want to serve time in prison.
Such reasons for flight appear to show disrespect for the judi-
cial process as a whole, rather than solely for the district court.' 3 0
The purpose of the entire judiciary in a criminal context is to inter-
pret the law and apply it to a given situation. If the defendant es-
capes from custody after the court has ruled against him, the
defendant is showing disrespect for the judicial system's ability to
perform its function. While trial courts and appellate courts have
different roles in the judicial system, their overall purpose is the
same. Therefore, a defendant who flees before the appeal stage
arguably shows the same degree of disrespect for the judicial pro-
cess as a defendant who flees during the appeal stage.' 3 ' Accord-
ingly, the justification that flight shows such a level of disrespect for
the courts that it disentitles the defendant to an appeal seems to
apply to pre-appeal flight.
The third justification for the fugitive dismissal rule is that the
rule deters escape. It seems clear that a rule providing appellate
courts with the authority to impose the sanction of dismissal on de-
fendants who escape while their appeals are pending will deter, to
some extent, similarly situated defendants from taking such ac-
tion.' 3 2 Similarly, the threat of having an appeal dismissed will also
deter defendants who ponder escaping before filing an appeal.' 33
In fact, as the dissent suggested, if appellate courts did not have the
authority to dismiss appeals of defendants who flee prior to appeal-
ing, then defendants would have the incentive to escape prior to
appeal, rather than take the chance of having their appeal dismissed
if they flee during the appeal. 13 4 Therefore, it seems obvious that
the deterrence justification applies to pre-appeal flight.
The fourth justification for the fugitive dismissal rule is that it
promotes the efficient operation of the appellate courts.13 5 Post-ap-
peal flight disrupts the operation of the appellate court: 13 6 the ap-
pellate process is delayed by at least the amount of time the
130 Id. at 1212 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The Court might counter by suggesting
that a defendant might flee because of a particular hatred for the trial judge or certain
district court proceedings, in which case the defendant would be aiming disrespect at
the district court only. However, such a specifically directed motivation for flight seems
surely to be a rare exception rather than the rule.
131 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
132 See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975).
133 See United States v. Matista, 932 F.2d 1055, 1057 (2d Cir. 1991).
134 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
135 See Matista, 932 F.2d at 1057.
136 See United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1988).
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defendant is at large. Further, because there is no way to determine
when a defendant will be returned to custody, there is no method
the appellate court can use to adjust its schedule accordingly.13 7
These justifications also apply to pre-appeal flight, because pre-
appeal flight causes the same delays in appellate court proceedings
as post-appeal flight.138 In fact, pre-appeal flight may disrupt the
organization and planning of the appellate court more than post-
appeal flight. In post-appeal flight, the appellate court is aware that
an appeal is pending and can arrange its docket to accomodate the
case, whereas pre-appeal flight cases could spring up on the appel-
late court docket with no notice to the appellate court at all, since
the time of appeal depends on when the defendant is returned to
custody.' 3 9 For these reasons, the justification that a fugitive dismis-
sal rule promotes the efficient operation of the appellate courts ap-
plies to pre-appeal flights.
The final justification for the fugitive dismissal rule is that the
delay caused by the defendant's flight can prejudice the government
in the event that a retrial was ordered. 140 A long delay in appellate
proceedings could prejudice the government in the event of a rever-
sal or remand, because locating witnesses and retrying the case long
after the original trial would, at the very least, place a heavy burden
on the government, and, if witnesses were no longer available or if
their memories had faded with time, such a delay could doom the
government's case.14' As discussed previously, the delay in appel-
late proceedings caused by pre-appeal flight is the same as the delay
caused by post-appeal flight.142 Therefore, the government is just
as likely to be prejudiced by pre-appeal flight. Accordingly, the jus-
tification that a fugitive dismissal rule would prevent any prejudice
resulting from a delay in proceedings applies to pre-appeal flight.
In brief, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the justifications
supporting a fugitive dismissal rule generally do not apply when the
defendant flees prior to filing an appeal is misplaced. Other than
enforceability, the justifications apply to pre-appeal flight. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that pre-appeal flight is suffi-
ciently connected to the appellate process to warrant the sanction of
dismissal in every case.
137 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1211 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140 See Persico, 853 F.2d at 137.
141 Id.
142 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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B. PRE-APPEAL FLIGHT OFTEN LACKS A SUFFICIENT CONNECTION TO
THE APPELLATE PROCESS
While the Supreme Court improperly asserted that the justifica-
tions for the fugitive dismissal rule do not apply to pre-appeal flight,
the Court correctly concluded that pre-appeal flight generally lacks
a sufficient connection to the appellate process to warrant the sanc-
tion of dismissal. The key word here is "sufficient." All escapes af-
fect the appellate process to a degree by delaying the proceedings
while the defendant remains a fugitive. The Court's argument is not
that pre-appeal flight has no connection to the appellate process,
but rather that it does not have a sufficient connection to deny the
defendant the right to appeal.143
There are several reasons why appellate courts generally should
not dismiss appeals of defendants who flee before the appellate pro-
cess has begun. These reasons are based on the underlying fact that
the pre-appeal fugitives are under the jurisdiction of the district
court, not the appellate court.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for disallowing the appli-
cation of the dismissal rule to pre-appeal flight is that a dismissal
would act as a second punishment. If defendants flee while they are
under the jurisdiction of the district court, they are then subject to
district court sanctions. In the instant case, the district court sanc-
tioned Ortega-Rodriguez's escape by convicting him of a separate
offense, contempt of court, and by sentencing him to an additional
twenty-one months in prison.1 44 By granting the government's mo-
tion to dismiss, the Eleventh Circuit essentially punished the same
action as the district court. Such double punishment is prohibited
by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 145
The Supreme Court correctly argued that the district court is
the proper authority to sanction pre-appeal flight.146 The main rea-
son that pre-appeal flight is most appropriately sanctioned by the
district court is that appellate courts lack the authority to sanction
pre-appeal flight. Those favoring the dismissal of pre-appeal flight
cases, in addition to criminal contempt sanctions, might argue that
these punishments are not separate, but rather constitute a single
combined consequence of escape. This argument is flawed, how-
ever, because the district court does not have the authority to dis-
143 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207.
144 Id. at 1202.
145 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989); Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
146 Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207.
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miss appeals.14 7 To impose contempt sanctions at the district court
level and to dismiss the appeal requires action by two separate enti-
ties. Therefore, such action should be considered double punish-
ment. The issue then becomes which court ought to sanction pre-
appeal flight.
Appellate courts have supervisory power to promulgate proce-
dural rules governing the management of litigation. t48  The
Supreme Court has maintained a reasonableness standard in deter-
mining the validity of appellate court rules.149 However, there are
several factors that suggest that a dismissal rule for pre-appeal flight
is an unreasonable exercise of the appellate court's authority.
Again, the fact that the defendant is under the jurisdiction of
the district court implies that an appellate court rule governing such
a defendant would be unreasonable because it would lead to double
punishment. More significantly, a pre-appeal dismissal rule is un-
reasonable because it is too broad and drastic a measure: broad be-
cause it would allow appellate courts to dismiss appeals of any
defendant who, at any point, obtained fugitive status; 150 drastic be-
cause it would allow the extreme sanction of dismissal, even if a de-
fendant was not a fugitive long enough to seriously affect the
operation of the judicial process.15 1 Accordingly, a rule permitting
appellate courts to dismiss appeals of defendants who flee prior to
filing an appeal is not a reasonable exercise of the courts' supervi-
147 FED. R. APP. P. 47 gives appellate courts the authority to make procedural rules for
perfecting appeals. See supra note 102.
148 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 n.10 (1980).
149 Thomas v. Am, 414 U.S. 140, 155 (1985). The Supreme Court also noted that
appellate court rules must not violate the Constitution or any statutes. Id. at 148. This
is not a concern here, though, as the Government pointed out that there is no constitu-
tional right to an appeal, and the statute granting the right of appeal to criminal defend-
ants does not set forth the procedural requirements for perfecting an appeal. Brief for
United States at 9-10, Ortega-Rodriguez (91-7749). The procedural requirements for an
appeal are contained in FED. R. APP. P. 47, which allows appellate courts to make rules
governing their practice. This Note argues that, contrary to the dissent's opinion, a rule
authorizing an appellate court to dismiss appeals of defendants who are under the juris-
diction of a district court is not a rule governing the appellate court's practice.
150 Such a rule would extend the power of the appellate court to the beginning stages
of the judicial process if, for example, a defendant jumps bail immediately after indict-
ment and is gone for a year before being captured and tried.
151 If a fugitive is recaptured after only several days, the main justifications for the
dismissal rule would not apply. Enforceability is not a concern after capture, and such a
short escape does not delay the wheels of justice or prejudice the government. While
any escape disrespects the entire judicial system, see supra notes 129-31 and accompany-
ing text, flight at such an early stage arguably directs more disrespect to the arresting
officers than to any court. Finally, while trial court sanctions can deter escape, the dis-





In short, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that pre-ap-
peal flight generally lacks a sufficient connection to the appellate
process to warrant the sanction of dismissal. Defendants who flee
prior to sentencing remain under the jurisdiction of the district
court, which appropriately sanctions such action with prosecution
for contempt. To also allow the appellate court to sanction these
defendants would be to allow double punishment. Moreover, a pre-
appeal flight dismissal rule is not a reasonable exercise of an appel-
late court's authority.
C. EXCEPTIONS WHERE PRE-APPEAL FLIGHT IS SUFFICIENTLY
CONNECTED TO THE APPELLATE PROCESS WARRANT
DISMISSAL
The Supreme Court properly determined that appellate courts
should have discretion to apply general rules of dismissal to specific,
recurring situations in which pre-appeal flight is sufficiently con-
nected to the appellate process. This determination acknowledged
the fact that in some limited instances dismissal of appeal is a rea-
sonable exercise of appellate authority.
One exception identified by the Court applies when the delay
caused by the fugitive status would prejudice the government in re-
trying the case. 153 The controversial issue will then be to determine
the point at which a delay caused by pre-appeal flight prejudices the
government sufficiently to warrant the sanction of dismissal. None-
theless, the Court correctly left that determination to the appellate
courts. As long as an appellate court recognizes a sufficient connec-
tion to the appellate process, dismissal will be appropriate. 54
Pre-appeal flight that forces the severance of appeals is another
exception identified by the Court that could warrant a general rule
152 The government argued that such a rule is reasonable in light of the interests it is
designed to protect, such as protecting the dignity of the courts and promoting the effi-
cient operation of the courts. Brief for United States at 16-17, Ortega-Rodriguez (91-
7749). This Note argues, however, that a pre-appeal flight dismissal rule is reasonable
in light of those interests only in those exceptional situations in which pre-appeal flight
adversely affects the appellate process.
153 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (1993). As the Court
correctly noted, the flight in the present matter would not fall under this exception be-
cause Ortega-Rodriguez's appeal claimed insufficiency of evidence, which if reversed
would not require a retrial. Therefore, there would be no possibility of prejudice. Id.
154 Again, the Court noted that appellate courts should not consider such issues on a
case by case basis, but rather in the form of general rules. Id. at 1209. The prohibition
of case by case analysis lessens the possibility that appellate courts could use their dis-
cretion to dismiss every pre-appeal flight situation.
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of dismissal. 15 5 Because the severance of appeals causes the appel-
late courts to duplicate their costs unnecessarily, there is little doubt
that pre-appeal flight that prevents the consolidation of appeals ad-
versely affects the appellate process.
The Supreme Court properly concluded that appellate courts
should carve out their own exceptions to the general rule that pre-
appeal flight lacks a sufficient connection to the appellate process to
warrant dismissal. Exceptions should be made in certain instances
because the connection to the appellate process is so strong that
dismissing the appeal would be reasonable, in light of the interests
that the fugitive dismissal rule is designed to protect. For example,
when pre-appeal flight causes the severance of an appeal, that ap-
peal may be reasonably dismissed, due to the court's interest in pro-
moting an efficient use of its resources. For this reason, the
Supreme Court correctly afforded the appellate courts discretion to
formulate general rules of dismissal for certain pre-appeal flights
that are sufficiently connected to the appellate process.
D. THE FUTURE OF THE FUGITIVE DISMISSAL RULE
While the Supreme Court identified two exceptions that allow
appellate courts to find sufficient connection to the appellate pro-
cess to warrant dismissal, it is clear that the Court did not intend to
limit the appellate courts' discretion to those two situations. For
this reason, the future application of the fugitive dismissal rule to
pre-appeal flights is likely to be varied and unpredictable.
One court, however, has already applied the Supreme Court's
holding in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States.15 6 In United States v.
Reese,15 7 the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
appeal of a defendant who fled after being convicted but before be-
ing sentenced. 158 The court in Reese, following the Supreme Court's
decision in Ortega-Rodriguez, dismissed the appeal because "by be-
coming a fugitive he [the defendant] disrupted the appellate pro-
cess, precluding the court from consolidating his appeal with that of
his codefendant."'159
In its analysis, the Reese court acknowledged the Supreme Court
standard that there must be a connection between the flight and the
appellate process, and that pre-appeal flight may lack the connec-
155 Id.
156 United States v. Reese, 993 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 255. The defendant in Reese remained a fugitive for five years until he was




tion to justify the sanction of dismissal. 60 The Reese court then
identified the two exceptions laid out by the Supreme Court, includ-
ing the severed appeals exception.' 61 Accordingly, the court in
Reese held that "a defendant whose flight prevents consolidation of
his appeal with that of a codefendant is not entitled to a belated
appeal to this court."' 162
In Ortega-Rodriguez, it is likely that the Eleventh Circuit, on re-
mand, will dismiss Ortega-Rodriguez's appeal again, fashioning the
same rule as did the Reese court. Likewise, the appellate courts that
followed the Eleventh Circuit are likely to formulate similar rules.'
63
In contrast, it is more difficult to predict what rules regarding pre-
appeal fugitives will be formulated by those circuits that either have
declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit or have yet to address the
issue. 1r'
VI. CONCLUSION
In Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court properly
limited the application of the fugitive dismissal rule to those situa-
tions in which the defendant's fugitive status is sufficiently con-
nected to the appellate process to make the dismissal a reasonable
exercise of appellate authority. The Court also correctly indicated
that not all pre-appeal flights lacked the requisite connection to the
appellate process, and stated that appellate courts could formulate
general rules to apply in specific, recurring situations in which pre-
appeal flight is sufficiently connected to the appellate process. The
Court's holding comports with common sense. It seems reasonable
to allow appellate courts to sanction behavior that affects the appel-
late process. At the same time, it seems unreasonable to allow ap-
160 Id. at 256.
161 Id.
162 Id. The court added that "[b]y thwarting consolidation, such fugitivity inherently
disrupts the appellate process. To reward the fugitive by granting his claim to a second
helping of the court's limited resources would be perverse indeed." Id.
163 The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits are likely to develop similar rules as the
court in Reese, because those appellate courts have already indicated that dismissing ap-
peals of defendants who flee prior to appeal is a reasonable exercise of appellate author-
ity. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Therefore, those courts are likely to
be in favor of dismissing appeals in cases where the pre-appeal flight significantly affects
the appellate process.
164 Because the Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez left some discretion with the appel-
late courts concerning the development of exceptions to the rule of no dismissal for pre-
appeal flight cases, the courts that have previously declined to extend the dismissal rule
to pre-appeal flight may interpret these exceptions more narrowly. Those courts which
have not dealt with the pre-appeal flight issue will be much less predictable because they
have exhibited no inclination either way.
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pellate courts to sanction conduct that takes place before district
courts, unless the appellate court in question is significantly affected
by that conduct.
In any event, after Ortega-Rodriguez, appellate courts probably
will be most inclined to apply the fugitive dismissal rule to defend-
ants who escape prior to appealing when the defendant remains a
fugitive for an extended period of time or if the flight caused a sev-
erance of appeals. In other situations, pre-appeal flight probably is
less likely to be sanctioned with dismissal.
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